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The hanging onept of matter in H. Weyl's thought,
1918  1930
Erhard Sholz, Wuppertal
Abstrat
During the long deade of transformation of mathematial physis
between 1915 and 1930, H. Weyl interated with physis in two highly
produtive phases and ontributed to it, among others, by his widely
read book on Spae - Time - Matter (Raum Zeit - Materie) (1918 
1923) and on Group Theory and Quantum Mehanis (Gruppentheo-
rie und Quantenmehanik) (1928 - 1931). In this time Weyl's under-
standing of the onstitution of matter and its mathematial desription
hanged onsiderably. At the beginning of the period he started from
a "dynamisti" and geometrial oneption of matter, following and
extending the Mie-Hilbert approh, whih he gave up during the year
1920. After transitional experiments with a singularity (and in this
sense topologial) approah in 1921/22, he developed an open perspe-
tive of what he alled an ageny theory of matter. The idea for it was
formulated already before the advent of the new quantum mehanis
in 1925/26. It turned out to be well suited to be taken over to the
quantum view as a kind of heritage from the rst half of the deade.
At the end of the period, Weyl ompletely renouned his earlier belief
in the possibility to onstrut matter from a geometrially unied
eld theory. He now posed the possibility of a geometrization of the
mathematial forms underlying the rising quantum physial desrip-
tion of matter as a ompletely open problem for future researh.
Introdution
It may appear a strange question to ask for the hanging views of a mathe-
matiian on the onept of matter. Why not pose it for a natural sientist
or a philosopher? But Hermann Weyl was, as we know, a bit of all of them.
His views on mathematis and their foundations made it impossible to sep-
arate mathematis and its meaning from broader ontexts of its use as a
oneptual form and as a symboli tool for the understanding of nature (or
at least some aspets of it).
During the long deade of transformation of mathematial physis, as
we may all the time between 1915 and 1930, with the rise of the general
theory of relativity (GRT) and the origin of the new quantum mehanis
(QM), H. Weyl interated with physis in two highly produtive phases and
ontributed to the development of both, theoretial physis and the mathe-
matial onepts and methods in it. The rst phase lasted from 1916 to 1923
and had as main outspring his widely read book on Spae - Time - Matter
(Raum Zeit - Materie) (Weyl 1918b), whih we will also refer to by RZM. In
this period the book had ve suessive editions with onsiderable extensions
and/or alterations well doumenting the shifts in the understanding of the
subjet by its author. Some of these hanges were of a more tehnial nature
for general relativity or the mathematis involved, others were of more basi
nature, inluding in partiular the hanging haraterization and mathemat-
ial desription of matter. In the middle of the 1920s Weyl worked on the
representation theory of Lie groups (1924/1925) and wrote a book on the
philosophy of mathematis and the natural sienes (1925/1926), before he
started to ontribute atively to the rising quantum mehanis, ulminating
in his seond book about mathematial physis, Group Theory and Quantum
Mehanis (Weyl 1928).
The growing awareness of the unreduible and far-reahing role of quan-
tum properties had already ontributed to onsiderable shifts of Weyl's on-
ept of matter during the rst phase of involvement in physis. In the seond
half of the long deade his views were deeply transformed by the rise of
quantum physis. This transformation was, of ourse, muh more than a
personal experiene. It reeted the experiene of the whole ommunity of
researhers in basi physis of the time, although seen from a spei Weylian
perspetive. As suh, it may be illuminating for a historial and philosoph-
ial understanding of the transformation of the onept of matter, brought
about by the tension resulting from the unnished double revolution of
GRT and QM during the 1920s.
1
In spite of the drasti dierene between
Weyl's onept of matter at the beginning of the period and at the end of
it, we easily pereive a ommon thread linking both ends. This ommon
underlying feature is a dynamisti view of matter. This haraterization has
to be understood in a general, philosophio-oneptual sense whih may be
related, but need not be, to the eletrodynamial piture of matter whih
gave a new thrive to dynamism among physiists and mathematiians of the
early 20th entury.
In the history and philosophy of physis, the dynamisti view of matter
in the early 20th entury is often restrited to the exlusively eletromagneti
approah. Suh a restrition shadows o the intriate link to the quantum
theoretial phase, whih played a role for some of the protagonists of the
period. Of ourse, also Weyl started from Mie's eletrodynamial theory of
matter when he rst looked for an adequate modern mathematial expres-
sion of suh a dynamisti view. From this basis he developed his program
of a geometrially unied eld theory in the rst phase of his involvement
in mathematial physis.
2
The impat of quantum physis replaed lassial
1
A. Pais' desription of the hange of matter onepts by the rising quantum theory as
the end of the game of pebbles (Pais 1986, 324) ts already well to this shift, although
Pais used it as a header for the rise of seond quantized elds starting in the late 1920s.
2
For Weyl's rst phase of involvement in mathematial physis ompare (Sigurdsson
1991, Sholz 2001b), for broader views on unied eld theories see (Vizgin 1994,
Goldstein/Ritter 2000, Cao 1997, Goenner 2004).
2
eld pitures by quantum stohastial desriptions of the ageny nature of
matter, as Weyl liked to all it. At the end of the period disussed here, he
ompletely renouned his earlier belief in the possibility to onstrut mat-
ter from a geometrially unied eld theory. He now posed the possibility
of a geometrization of the mathematial forms underlying the rising quan-
tum physial desription of matter as a ompletely open problem for future
researh.
In this artile I present a kind of logitudinal setion through the long
deade, oberved along the trajetory of a single person, who was partially a
ontributor and partially a well informed observer of the development.
3
We
start with Weyl's turn towards Mie's theory of matter, his own ontribution
to it, and his rather early distahment, whih was related to the inuenes
of early quantum mehnis without being a neessary onlusion from it.
After a short phase of relaxation of lassial explanations of matter, by a
ombination of metrial and topologial aspets (matter haraterized by
singularities in spae-time), Weyl developed an open perspetive of what he
alled an ageny theory of matter. The idea for it was formulated already
before the advent of the new quantum mehanis in 1925/26. It turned
out to be well suited to be taken over to the quantum view as a kind of
heritage from the rst half of the deade.
Adherene to Mie's dynamisti approah to matter
After Weyl ame bak to neutral Switzerland from his war duty in the Ger-
man army in May 1916, he started a ompletely new phase of his researh,
whih was imbued by a longing for a sounder basis of knowledge.
4
For him,
this meant to work in a broad and interonneted set of elds omprising
the foundations of analysis, dierential geometry, general relativity, unied
eld theory and the basi strutures of matter. Only if we take this broad
range of intelletual ativities into aount, we an get an adequate sense of
Weyl's oneptual and theoretial moves inside the single elds. Let us have
a look at some points of suh interonnetions:
- In the foundations of mathematis our author shifted from his own
onstrutive-arithmetial approah for a haraterization of the on-
ept of ontinuum (Weyl 1918a) to a kind of Brouwerian intutionism
(Weyl 1921b). For a while, he believed Brouwer's approah to possess
an intimate onnetion to his ideas in purely innitesimal geometry.
Weyl ould well haraterize purely innitesimal strutures on the
level of dierential geometry by his generalization of a Riemannian
metri by ombining a onformal struture with a length onnetion
3
A omplementary view at several transversal setions (in time) with a broad evalu-
ation of authors and approahes is presented in (Goldstein/Ritter 2000).
4
See (Sigurdsson 1991, 64.), (Shappaher 2003).
3
ϕ =
∑
i ϕidx
i
. It was, however, muh more diult to give them
a mathematial meaning on the foundational (and topologial) level.
Here a preise oneptual haraterization was laking. Weyl was well
aware of this deieny whih ontributed to tensions and shifts inside
his foundational ontributions. For a while, Brouwer's revolutionary
approah to the ontinuum (as Weyl alled it in 1920) appeared him
to oer a promising road.
5
- For some years, Weyl onsidered his gauge geometrial generalization of
the Riemannian metri as the proper approah for a unied eld theory
of gravitation and eletromagnetism and, moreover, a eld theory of
matter based upon it.
6
- Rising doubts with respet to the physial feasibility of this immediate
physial interpretation of gauge geometry ontributed to a turn to-
wards a more basi philosophio-oneptual analysis of the priniples
of ongruene geometry in Weyl's mathematial analysis of the problem
of spae.
7
- The neessity, or at least usefulness, to aept lassial logial priniples
(exluded middle) in the proof of the main theorem of the analysis of
the spae problem ontributed to rethink his radial position in the
foundations of mathematis.
In the seond point indiated above, the eld theoreti approah to mat-
ter onstitution, Weyl was deeply inuened by Mie's eletromagneti theory
of matter whih he got to know through Hilbert's modiation during the
autumn 1915.
8
Hilbert attempted to arrive at a kind of mathematial synthe-
sis of Mie's and Einstein's ideas on eletromagnetism (Mie) and gravitation
(Einstein). He indiated how to nd a united Hamiltonian for gravitation
and eletromagnetism in a generally ovariant setting.
9
He was onvined,
that in suh a lassial united eld theory the riddles of the grainy struture
of matter should be solvable. H. Weyl and F. Klein were not onvined that
Hilbert's attempted synthesis of Mie and Einstein was aeptable as a phys-
ial theory. They argued for a broader understanding of Hilbert's approah.
E. Noether's mathematial analysis of Hilbert's invariane onjetures (later
Noether theorems) ontributed an essential mathematial stepping stone
for it.
10
5
Compare (Hesseling 2003, 121.), (Sholz 2000).
6
See footnote 2.
7
(Sholz 2004a)
8
Compare (Corry 1999a, Corry 1999b, Kohl 2002, Sauer 1999, Vizgin 1994).
9
For a disussion of Hilbert's researh program building upon and extending Mie's eld
theoreti matter theory see (Sauer 1999), for a ritial evaluation of Hilbert's relation to
Einstein's theory of general relativity (Corry 1997, Renn 1999).
10
See (Rowe 1999, Brading 2002).
4
Although a entral point of the septiism resulted from the unlear role
of energy onservation in Hilbert's approah, Weyl was, moreover, not on-
vined that Hilbert's approah was able to lead to a uniation of gravitation
and eletromagnetism, in whih matter strutures were better derivable than
in Mie's original version. In the rst edition of his book he therefore dis-
ussed a eld theoreti matter onept essentially as in Mie's original purely
eletromagneti approah (Weyl 1918b, 25). Hilbert's generalization was
only mentioned in passing, in the setion whih treated the modiation of
the Hamiltonian priniple for eletromagnetism by gravitation (Weyl 1918b,
32). On the other hand, Weyl presented Mie's approah in suh a onvined
rhetori form that the reader might easily get the impression that Mie's re-
searh goal had already nearly been ahieved. The desired result (derivation
of a grainy struture from eld laws) seemed lose to sure. After a om-
parison of Mie's theory with Maxwell-Lorentz's, Weyl stated:
The theory of Maxwell and Lorentz annot hold for the interior
of the eletron; therefore, from the point of view of the ordinary
theory of the eletrons we must treat the eletrons as something
given a priori, as a foreing body to the eld. A more general
theory of eletrodynamis has been proposed by Mie, by whih
it seems possible to derive the matter from the eld . . . .(Weyl
1918b, 165)
This formulation was kept unhanged by Weyl in the next three editions.
11
He only hanged it during the last revision for the fth edition (1923). Then
he learly expressed the open status of Mie's attempt and presented it, in
an essentially didatial approah, as nothing but an example of a physial
theory whih agrees ompletely with the reent ideas about matter (Weyl
1918b,
5
1923, 210).
Mie's proposal tted beautifully to Einstein's detetion of the energy-
mass equivalene of speial relativity and seemed to extend it. In a passage
ommenting the equivalene E = mc2, Weyl argued:
We have thus attained a new, purely dynamial view of matter
(footnote: Even Kant in his Metaphysishe Anfangsgründe der
Naturwissenshaft teahes the dotrine that matter lls spae
not by its mere existene but in virtue of the repulsive fores of
all its parts.) Just as the theory of relativity theory has taught
us to rejet the belief that we an reognize one and the same
point in spae at dierent times, so now we see that there is no
longer a meaning in speaking of the same position of matter at
dierent times. (Weyl 1918b, 162), (Weyl 1922, 202)
11
It thus appears verbally unhanged in the third edition on whih H.L. Brose's English
translation is based (Weyl 1922, 206). Here, as in other ases, our English quotes from
RZM are following Brose's translation, where available.
5
Already here, in the ontext of speial relativity, he desribed an eletron as
a kind of "energy knot whih propagates through empty spae like a water
wave aross the sea, and whih ould no longer be onsidered as element of
some self-idential substane. Then, of ourse, there arose the problem to
understand both, this kind of propagation of energy, and the stability of the
energy knot. Weyl stated the new hallenge of (speial) relativity to eld
theory, whih arose from a dynamial understanding of matter/energy:
The theory of elds has to explain why the eld is granular in
struture and why these energy-knots preserve themselves per-
manently from energy and momentum in their passage to and
fro (. . . ); therein lies the problem of matter. (Weyl 1918b, 162,
emphasis in original) (Weyl 1922, 203)
Like the dynamists of the early 19th entury, Weyl now insisted that atoms
ould not be onsidered as invariant fundamental onstituents of matter:
Atoms and eletrons are not, of ourse, ultimate invariable el-
ements, whih natural fores seize from without, pushing them
hither and thither, but they are themselves distributed ontinu-
ously und subjet to minute hanges of a uid harater in their
smallest piees. It is not the eld that requires matter as its
arrier in order to be able to exist itself, but matter is, on the
ontrary, an ospring of the eld. (ibid.).
12
It seems worthwhile to remark that these general passages on the dynamisti
outlook on the problem of matter were not hanged by Weyl until (and
inluding) the fth edition of his book in 1923. On the other hand, the speial
role attributed to Mie's theory, or to his own unied eld theoreti approah,
underwent onsiderable hanges during the following years. But in spite of
all his enthusiasm for the new role of eld theory in the understanding of
matter, Weyl indiated already in 1918 after his presentation of Mie's theory,
that something new was rising at the (epistemi) horizon, whih might have
unforeseen onsequenes in the future. He ompared the atual status of
eld physis with the seemingly all-embraing harater of Newtonian mass-
point dynamis in the Laplae program at the turn to the 19th entury and
warned:
Physis, this time as a physis of elds, is again pursuing the
objet of reduing the totality of natural phenomena to a single
physial law: it was believed that this goal was almost within
reah when the mehanial physis of mass points, founded upon
Newton's Priniipia, was elebrating its triumphs. But also to-
day, provision is taken that our trees do not grow up to the sky.
12
Translation slightly adapted, E.S.
6
We do not yet know whether the state quantities underlying Mie's
theory sue for a haraterization of matter, whether it is in
fat purely eletrial in nature. Above all, the dark loud of
all those appearanes that we are provisionally seeking to deal
with by the quantum of ation throws its shadow upon the land
of of physial knowledge, threatening no one knows what new
revolution. (Weyl 1918b, 170)
13
A geometrial extension of Mie's theory of matter
A few months after his book manusript was nished, Weyl developed his
onept of a generalizated Weylian metri on a dierentiable manifold. In
tehnial terms his metri was given, and still an be haraterized, by an
equivalene lass of pairs, [(g, ϕ)], onsisting of a (semi)Riemannian met-
ris g =
∑
i,j gijdxidxj and a dierential form (length onnetion) ϕ =∑
i ϕidxi, up to equivalene by onformal fators in the Riemannian om-
ponent of the metri and gauge transformation of the length onnetion
form.
14
This generalization allowed a seemingly natural interpretation of
the potential of the eletromagneti eld by the length onnetion and thus
a metrial uniation of the main physial elds known at the time, gravi-
tation (g) and eletromagnetism (ϕ). Weyl onsidered this struture as an
important step forward for the Mie program of a dynamial haraterization
of matter. He published about it in several artiles, starting in 1918. In the
following year he inluded the approah into the third edition of his book
(Weyl 1918b,
3
1919).
The rst edition had ended with a setion on osmology, Considerations
of the world as a whole (Weyl 1918b, 33). In the third edition two new se-
tions were added, one on the world metris as the origin of the eletromag-
neti phenomena, ontaining an introdution to Weyl's unied eld theory,
and one on matter, mehanis and the presumable (mutmaÿlihes) law of
the world, in whih Weyl's extension of the Mie program was skethed. Like
in the rst edition, Hilbert's extension of Mie's program was only indiretly
mentioned in the setion on the ombined Hamiltonian priniple of eletro-
magnetism and gravitation. On the other hand, the last setion ulminated
in Weyl's own attempt to overbid both Mie and Hilbert by a derivation of the
disrete granular matter strutures from his gauge invariant ation prini-
ple. In his leture ourse on mathematis and the knowledge of nature of the
winter semester 1919/20 , Hilbert ountered by an aid remark that suh a
perspetive would lead to a kind of Hegelian physis, in whih the whole
world proess would not go beond the limited ontent of a nite thought
(Hilbert 1992, 100). He did not explain, though, why this kind of analysis
13
Unhanged in all editions, last one in (Weyl 1918b,
5
1923, 216). Translation from
(Weyl 1922, 212) slightly adapted by E.S.
14
(Varadarajan 2003, Vizgin 1994)
7
should not apply to his own program just as well .
In 1919 Weyl was at the high point of enthusiasm for his new theory.
The new setion in the third edition of his book started with a rhetori
trumpet-blast:
We rise to a nal synthesis . . . (Weyl 1918b,
3
1919, 242)
15
Part of his enthusiasm resulted apparently from the realization that gauge
invariane with respet to the hange of the length gauge led to a new invari-
ane priniple, whih in Weyl's semantis of the approah ould only be the
invariane of eletrial harge (Weyl 1918b,
3
1919) (Weyl 1922, 293). That
was, of ourse, a great ahievement of lasting importane, even if the spei
version of gauge invariane had later to be given up.
16
But Weyl hoped for
more. He expeted that on the one hand the osmologial modiation of
the Einstein equation should be a natural result from his gauge geometry.
On the other hand the stable solutions of the equations for the problem of
matter, satisfying adequate regularity onditions should lead to a disrete
set of solutions depending on some parameter β. This expetation had a
(formal) similarity to a set of disrete eigenvalues of an operator, although
here the operator was not linear.
The problem was, in fat, haraterized by a non-linear dierential equa-
tion of great omplexity. Even Weyl guessed that the available tools of
analysis would probably neither sue for a proof of their existene, nor for
an approximative alulation (Weyl 1918b,
3
1919, 260). This remark made
the epistemi status of Weyl's disrete solutions highly problemati. It
turned them rather into a symbol for a natural philosophial speulation
than into an objet for researh in mathematial physis. Weyl ontinued
the disussion by a beautiful remark.
The orspusulae whih orrespond to the possible eigenvalues
had to oexist in the same world besides eah other or in an-
other, mutually enforing on another subtle modiations of their
intrinsi struture; strange onsequenes seem here to arise for
the organization of the universe; perhaps they may make om-
prehensible its stillness in the large and unrest in the small.
(Weyl 1918b,
3
1919, 261)
When Weyl wrote these lines, he was at the peak of his belief in a strong
uniation program of fores and matter, whih ould be onstruted on
purely geometrial grounds. In the last long passage of the new added
15
Wir erheben uns zu einer letzten Synthese. Brose's translation redued the kik of
enthusiasm onsiderably: We now aim at a nal synthesis (Weyl 1922, 282). Weyl did
not weaken the rhetori until and inluding the fth edition, although he slightly revised
its wording by adding a nun (now) (Weyl 1918b,
5
1923).
16
See (Vizgin 1994, Brading 2002) and for a detailed, historially oriented disussion of
the underlying mathematis (Varadarajan 2003).
8
setions we nd a disussion of how he now saw the relationship between
geometry and physis in the light of his reent ndings.
We have realized that physis and geometry oinide with eah
other and that the world metris is one, and even the only one,
physial reality. Thus, in the nal onsequene, this physial
reality appears as nothing but a pure form; geometry has not
been physialized but physis has been geometrized (niht die
Geometrie ist zur Physik, sondern die Physik ist zur Geometrie
geworden). (Weyl 1918b,
3
1919)
H. Weyl was now at the apogee of the belief in a strong uniation whih
was both, deeply redutionist and highly idealisti. In his eyes, physis
seemed to be transformed to a purely formal status and was absorbed by
geometry. Matter had seemingly beome an epiphenomenon of the world
metris whih started to aquire a slightly mystial avour. In the mind
of our protagonist, the physializing tendeny of geometry among leading
protagonists of the 19th entury, inluding researhers like C.F. Gauss, N.I.
Lobahevsky, and B. Riemann, appeared turned upside down  even though
in this extreme form for only a year or two.
As we will see in a moment, this onvition did not hold for long. Already
in the fourth edition, this extremely redutionist passage was anelled by
its author. Now the book ended with another, less redutive passage on the
unifying power of the mind and an éloge of the hords from that harmony
of the spheres of whih Pythagoras and Kepler one dreamed (Weyl 1922,
312). Weyl did not hide that he had hanged his mind; in a separate artile
written for the physial ommunity shortly after the revisions for the fourth
edition, he explained frankly:
From the rst edition of RZM to the third one I took the posi-
tion of ( . . . ) [ a purely eld theoreti haraterization of matter,
E.S.℄, as I was harmed by the beauty and unity of pure eld the-
ory; in the fourth edition, however, I lost ondene in the eld
theory of matter by striking reasons and hanged to the seond
point of view [of a primay of matter, irreduible to interation
elds, E.S.℄ . (Weyl 1921a, 242)
Let us therefore have a look at the striking resons for this ontologial shift
at the beginning of the 1920s.
From speulations on the the ausal and the statistial view of
physis to a break with Mie's theory of matter
In the year 1919 Weyl gave a talk to the Swiss Naturforshende Gesellshaft
on the relationship between the ausal to the statistial view of physis whih
9
was published a year later (Weyl 1920). This paper has been strongly rit-
ized by P. Forman in his otherwise very stimulating artile on Weimar ul-
ture and its inuene on the disourse among physiists (Forman 1971) as a
doument of an antirational kind of onversion to aausality. We need not
take up here again the broader debate on the question how antirational the
move was and what kind of aausality was at stake here.
17
It may sue to
add that for Weyl the topi of his talk ontained a hallenging ombination of
questions in the oneptual foundations of ontemporary physis, inluding
the rising louds of quantum phenomena, with the question of how modern
natural siene an be made ompatible with metaphysial onsiderations of
the existential experiene of the openness of evolving life proesses and of the
freedom of personal ations. A entral topi of this talk was the diretedness
and irreversibility of time, whih appeared Weyl to be linked to some proess
level of irreduibly statistial nature.
18
The talk took plae about the time of his turn to Brouwer's intuition-
ism. In this respet we ould even speak of a kind of onversion.
19
Weyl
speulated that perhaps Brouwer's approah ould lead to a solution of sev-
eral fundamental problems at one strike. In mathematis he hoped for an
answer to the foundational question of the onept of the mathematial on-
tinuum and for a philosophially and mathematially sound haraterization
of the topologial substrate of purely innitesimal geometry; in physis
he expeted a break with the rigidity of the ausality struture in lassial
mehanis (Gesetzesphysik) and an aess to understand the irreduible di-
retness of time. He expeted that satisfying answers to all these questions
might have some intimate link to the open proess of beoming inherent
in Brouwer's hoie sequene for the haraterization of the intuitionisti
ontinuum:
Finally and foremost, it is inbuilt into the essene of the ontin-
uum that it annot be treated as a rigid being, but rather only
as something what is ontinuously evolving in an innite, inward
bound proess of beoming. (Weyl 1920, 121)
In this speulative thought, Weyl hoped to nd a ommon thread binding
together the foundations of analysis, purely innitesimal geometry, the
diretedness of time ow in the physial world, its determinative openness,
and a onjetured irreduibly stohastial nature of physial laws, whih
would break with the lassial kind of lawfulness (ausality in the language
of the time).
17
See the illuminating omments and ritique of Forman's original presentation in
(Hendry 1984, Sigurdsson 1991, Stöltzner 2002) and also the modiations in (Forman
1980).
18
Weyl hinted at the possibility that the lassial mehanial disussion on ergodiity
had to be revised the light of some mysterious disontinuity introdued reently by
quantum theory (Weyl 1920, 118).
19
Compare, e.g., (Hesseling 2003, 127).
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In September 1920, during the disussions of the Bad Nauheim meet-
ing of the German Naturforsher Versammlung and from a draft manusript
of Pauli's ontribution on relativity to the Enzyklopädie der Wissenshaften
Weyl got to know ontent and reason of Pauli's ritial evaluation of his
modied version of the Mie theory of matter. This onjuntion of detailed
sienti ritiism, oming from a personally lose, young expert in the eld,
with his own most reent oneptual and metaphysial speulations, under-
mining the lassially deterministi eld strutures anyhow, led Weyl to give
up the belief in his program of a geometrially unied eld theoretial deriva-
tion of matter strutures. At the end of the year, in a letter to Felix Klein,
in whih he reported on his reent advanes on mathematial and physial
questions (inluded or not into the just nished fourth edition of RZM), he
reported among others:
Finally I thoroughly distahed myself from Mie's theory and ame
to a dierent position with respet to the problem of matter. I
no longer aept eld physis as the key to reality. The eld,
the ether, appears to me only as a transmitter of eets, whih is
ompletely feeble by itself; while matter is a reality lying beyond
the eld and ausing its states . . . . (Letter H. Weyl to F. Klein,
Deember 28, 1920 1920)
20
Similar phrases are to be found lose to the end of the fourth edition of RZM.
Here the last setion, ontaing Weyl's version of Mie's theory was no longer
announed under the emphati title Matter, mehanis, and presumable
world law as in the third edition. The disussion was now only presented
as a development of the simplest priniple of ation . . . .
It ontained a short disussion of some onsequenes of Weyl's gauge
invariant quadrati ation S2
√
|detg| for the Hamiltonian of a ombined
theory of gravitation and eletromagnetism, with S the salar urvature of
Weyl geometry. Now he ommented that this ation is only the simplest
assumption for alulation, for whih the author no longer wanted to insist
that it is realised in nature (Weyl 1922, 295). For anybody who ontinued
to read the book until the end, Weyl made lear that he now onjetured a
lose interrelation between the diretedness of time ow with quantum jumps
as seen in the Bohr model of the atom. That was no longer ompatible with
the lassial strutures of time invertible determinism:
20
Endlih habe ih mih gründlih von der Mie'shen Theorie losgemaht und bin zu
einer anderen Stellung zum Problem der Materie gelangt. Die Feldphysik ersheint mir
keineswegs mehr als der Shlüssel zu der Wirklihkeit; sondern das Feld, der Äther ist
mir nur noh der in sih selbst völlig kraftlose Übermittler der Wirkungen, die Materie
aber eine jenseits des Feldes liegende und dessen Zusände verursahende Realität. Mit dem
Weltgesetz (Hamiltonshes Prinzip), das die Wirkungsübertragung im Äther regelt, wäre
noh gar wenig für das Verständnis aller Naturersheinungen gewonnen. (ibid. emphasis
in original); ompare (Sigurdsson 1991).
11
We must here state in unmistakable language that physis at its
present stage an in no wise be regarded as lending support to the
belief that there is a ausality of physial nature whih is founded
on rigorously exat laws. The extended eld, ether is merely
the transmitter of eets and is, of itself, powerless; it plays a part
that is in no wise dierent from that whih spae with its rigid
Eulidean metrial struture plays aording to the old view; but
now the rigid motionless harater has beome transformed into
one whih gently yields and adapts itself. . . . (Weyl 1922, 311,
emphasis in original)
Now the old duality of eld (ether) and matter was bak again for our
protagonist. This brought him loser to the pereption of the problem by
the majority of physiists working on the struture of matter and indiated
a growing distane to the views held by A. Einstein.
A short-lived singularity theory making plae to ageny stru-
tures of matter
As Weyl ame from as strong eld theoreti paradigm, it was natural for
him in the years 1920/21 to haraterize matter by its formal relationship
to the interation eld(s).
21
Thus in the fourth edition of RZM Weyl stated
his new viewpoint learly:
Contrary to Mie's view, matter now appears as a real singularity
of the eld. (Weyl 1922, 262, emphasis in original)
22
But then, matter had somehow to be loated in a determinative boundary
struture of the eld and the old question of the strutures of matter, whih
in the lassial mehanisti view had been given by the assumptions of its
atomi onstitution and the hypothetial extension of mehanial laws to
the atomi level, was again open. After the experiene of dynamisti hopes
during his period of adherene to the Mie theory, and in the light of reent
modiations oming from experimental knowledge in mirophysis, Weyl
ame to the onlusion:
If matter is to be regarded as a boundary singularity of the eld,
our eld-equations make assertions only about the possible states
of the eld and not about the onditioning of the states of the eld
by the matter. This gap is provisionally lled by the quantum
theory in a manner of whih the underlying priniples are still
21
For Weyl, his uniation of the interation still seemed valid, after his distahement
from Mie's matter theory, and thus the singular form eld would apply; septiists with
respet to his uniation ould easily reread his remarks by turning to the plural elds.
22
In the German original (Weyl 1918b,
4
1921, 238), no longer in the fth edition.
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ompletely ununderstood. (Weyl 1922, 303, emphasis in origi-
nal)
23
Now the task to understand matter mathematially ould be approahed
from dierent viewpoints. One was topologial in nature. General relativity
oered the opportunity to onsider a dierential topologial manifold with
boundaries, in the interior of whih the elds are regular, while they are
singular on the boundaries and diverge in respetive limiting proesses. In
an artile written for Annalen der Physik shortly after the publiation of
the fourth edition of RZM, Weyl explained his new viewpoint more in detail
(Weyl 1921a). He argued in two diretions. Coming from the point of view of
speial relativity and Minkowski spae, the generalization for GRT onsisted
not only in a deformation of the metri but ould also omprise a topologial
modiation of the underlying manifold. Weyl argued that from the spae-
time manifold with a ombined eletromagneti and gravitational eld, the
subsets on whih the elds obtain singular values should be omitted.
In the general theory of relativity the world an possess arbitrary
(...) onnetedness: nothing exludes the assumption that in its
Analysis-Situs properties it behaves like a four-dimensional Eu-
lidean ontinuum, from whih dierent tubes of innite length
in one dimension are o. (Weyl 1921a, 252f.)
If the general relativisti point of view was onsidered as the more realisti
one, it even appeared as more natural to turn the view round. One would
then have to argue in terms of pasting rather than of utting:
The simply onneted ontinuum from whih we onstrut the
domain of the eld by utting o the tubes is nothing but a
mathematial tion, although the metrial relations persisting
in the eld strongly propose the extension of the real spae by
addition of suh titious improper (erdihteter uneigentliher)
regions orresponding to the single matter partiles. (ibid.)
For Weyl, this hange of the mathematial onstrution of spae went in hand
with a hange of the understanding of the relationship between spae-time
and matter:
Aording to [this℄ pereption, matter itself is nothing spatial (ex-
tensive) at all, although it is inserted in a ertain spatial neigh-
bourhood. (Weyl 1921a, 254, emphasis in original)
He must have liked this idea. One of the Fihtean motifs on the onstru-
tion of matter and spae from fores, whih had impressed Weyl already
23
The translation of the last phrase has been slightly hanged to adapt it loser to the
German original (Weyl 1918b,
4
1921, 276) than in Brose's translation. This passage is no
longer ontained in the fth edition.
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at the time of his turn towards purely innitesimal geometry, anquired
here a new fae and persisted in a modied form.
24
On the other hand, there was a physial approah to the problem of
matter. In addition to the proper laws of the eld(s) one had to study the
laws aording to whih matter exites the eld ations. For Weyl, matter
was now turning into an irreduible originator of dynamial exitation of
the interation eld(s) and was itself guided by the latter in its own spatio-
temporal dynamis. He insisted that it ould neither be understood as a
substane in the sense of traditional natural philosophy, nor ould it be de-
rived from the eld as in the Mie version of dynamiist matter explanation.
Weyl preferred to give a desription and a term of his own to haraterize
matter as an ageny (Agens). This word was unommon in the German
language, and, to my knowledge, even not used in the earlier disourses on
natural philosophy. Weyl apparently shaped it on his own from the Latin
gerundial form agens for something that is ating. In his usage of the word,
an ageny pereption of matter was not far from the older dynamiist one
of the philosophial debate of the early 19th entury. As, however, the dy-
namisti view of matter had been linked to the eletromagneti world view
and its generalizations in the Mie - Hilbert - Weyl approah by lassial eld
theories, Weyl had good reasons to demarate the break with this semantial
eld by the hoie of a new word.
Dierent to the older eld theoretial theories, Weyl onsidered it as an
important feature of the ageny view that it onsidered matter as something
whih ats on spatial strutures like elds, although it is not itself loated
inside spae. Already in 1921, several years before the advent of the rened
form of the quantum mehanis, Weyl stated optimistially:
In addition to the substane and the eld pereptions we have
to add a third view of matter as an ageny (Agens) eeting the
eld states. . . . It makes plae for the modern physis of matter,
working with statistial onepts, besides the stritly funtional
physis of a lassial eld. (Weyl 1921a, 255)
For Weyl, suh a shift had nothing to do with a longing for aausality, or
even the adoration of it. He rather insisted that the view of mehanial and
lassially eld theoreti physis had redued ausality to a purely funtional
mathematial relationship, while the ageny pereption opened a possibility
to understand the ausation of eld states by matter in a new and deeper
way.
Here the speied diretion of the passage of time: past→ future,
whih annot nd its plae in eld physis, an be taken up
again; in fat it is most losely related to the idea of ausation.
(Weyl 1921a, 256)
24
Compare (Sholz 1995, Sholz 2001a).
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The haraterization of ausality by a deterministi and time-invertible law-
like struture as in lassial mehanis appeared him as an inappropriate
onept. The hange from lassial determination to a probabilisti one
would therefore not at all ontradit the onept of ausation. Just to the
ontrary, Weyl expeted that it might open the path towards a more appro-
priate understanding of the latter. Although his most reent turn had its
origin in the short-lived singularity theory of matter, the ageny paradigm
of matter was kept open for a modiation in its mathematial harater-
ization and for a future enrihment by an improved understanding of its
physial properties.
The ageny onept of matter as an open researh eld
The role Weyl assigned to singularities of lassial elds in the fourth edi-
tionoif RZM remained itself singular in his work. It did not appear earlier
and vanished, or was at least drastially redued in importane, nearly as fast
as it appeared. In the fth edition of his book the setion on further rigorous
solutions of the statial problem of gravitation, whih ontained the entral
passages on the singularity theory of the eletron, from whih we quoted
above, was ompletely reorganized. Apparently Weyl was not satised with
the outlook on the strong interpretation of singularities as the mathematial
lue to the solution of the problem of matter. In the fth edition and in
his later publiations on the philosophy of nature (Weyl 1924, Weyl 1927)
we nd the singularity model only in a weak sense, mentioned in passing
as nothing more than an idea illuminating the impossibility to loalize the
basi ageny strutures of matter diretly.
In the fth edition of RZM, Weyl no longer gave the impression that
he was already in possession of a mathematial lue to the solution of the
problem of matter. He now preferred to haraterize only the terrain of
investigation and disussed dierent approahes that had been tried, up to
then. Among these he mentioned, of ourse, Mie's theory and his own gen-
eralization as important examples. But now they were only presented as
explorative theoretial models, without any laim that they might lead to-
wards a reliable representation of reality.
In this disussion we nd beautiful, nearly poeti desriptions of the
atual state of knowledge as an open terrain:
We only perieve the bounding embankment of the subtle, deep
groove whih is dug into the metrial fae of the world by the
trajetory of the eletron; what is overed by the depth, remains
hidden to us. It may be that the whole groove is lled by a
eld, qualitatively equivalent to the outer one, as Mie assumed;
but just as well the abyss may be fathomless. Mie's pereption
dissolves matter into the eld; the other one removes it, so to
15
speak, from the eld. Aording to the latter view matter is an
ageny determining the eld, although in itself nothing spaelike,
extensional, but only loated in a ertain spatial neighbourhood,
from whih its eld eets depart. . . .
(Weyl 1918b,
5
1923, 286)
Coming loser to the middle of the 1920s, Weyl left it open whether it
seemed more promising to smooth o the eld for a mathematial repre-
sentation of the basi onstituents of matter (like in the Mie approah), to
exise it (like in the singularity approah of 1921), or to nd any other har-
aterization whih might take the statistial nature of quantum desriptions
better intor aount than the other ones:
Our desription of the eld surrounding an eletron is a rst,
stuttering formulation of suh laws. Here lies the working eld
for modern physis of matter, to whih belong, above all, the
fats and riddles of the quantum of ation (. . . ) As far as we an
judge today, the lawfulness aording to whih matter indues
eets an be desribed in statistial terms only, . . . . (RZM
5
1923, 286f.)
Independent of these open problems for an adequate mathematial harater-
ization of matter, it now appeared lear to him that matter, rather than the
eld had to be given primay for all experimental purposes or any pratial
exhange with nature.
Our willful ations have, primarily, always to grapple on matter,
only thus we an hange the eld. In fat, we then need two
kinds of laws for the explanation of natural phenomena: 1. eld
laws (. . . ), 2. laws regulating the exitation of the eld by matter.
. . . . (ibid.)
Finally ausality ame bak, for Weyl, to be a relation whih enabled human
beings to inuene the ourse of natural proesses by a willful modia-
tion of material onstellations in the world. As he had ome to the insight
that physial knowledge of the basi matter strutures was still highly re-
strited, he anelled those passages of the nal setions of earlier editions
of RZM, whih appeared muh too enthusiasti from his reently aquired
view. That did not exlude poeti allusions. The fth edition, the last one
revised or extending by himself, ended with a passage whih was both, sober
and propheti:
We were unable to pursue our analysis of spae and time with-
out studying matter in detail. Here, however, we are still on-
fronting riddles the solution of whih is not to be expeted from
eld physis. In the darkness still surrounding the problem of
16
matter, quantum theory may perhaps be the rst twinkling of
light. (Weyl 1918b,
5
1923, 317)
Weyl had entered the rst phase of ative intervention into mathematial
physis (the RZM-phase, as we might all it) with a strong program of
redutionist uniation; at the end of it, he learly saw the neessity to
distinguish ontologially and mathematially between interation elds and
matter. While for the rst lass the lassial eld theories ould be onsidered
as very suessful, the problem of matter had turned bak again into a riddle.
A view bak in 1930
Only two years after these lines were written, the rst twinkling of light
was stabilized by the establishment of quantum mehanis in the form of
wave mehanis and operator theory in Hilbert spaes. The ore of this de-
velopment was the produt of a new generation of physiists (W. Heisenberg,
W. Pauli, P. Jordan, P.A.M. Dira, E. Shrödinger, e.a.) who stood in lose
ommuniation with outstanding gures of the earlier period (N. Bohr, M.
Born, A. Sommerfeld, P. Ehrenfest, e.a.). Although Weyl was no member
of this group, he was lose enough to several of the partiipants that he was
immediately drawn into the turn to the new quantum theory at the middle
of the 1920s. In oral and written exhange with E. Shrödinger, W. Pauli,
M. Born and P. Jordan he even ontributed in ertain respets to it.
25
In
his leture ourse in winter semester 1927/28 on Group Theory and Quan-
tum Mehanis, he took up Shrödinger wave funtions and Pauli spinors
(in later terminology) as new mathematial forms to represent a stohasti-
ally determining matter ageny. In the book arising from it (Weyl 1928)
he ould already integrate Dira spinors for the haraterization of a rela-
tivisti matter eld of a new type. The seond edition (1931) entered into
the omplex and irritating disussion of seond quantization of these new
provisional symboli systems for the ageny haraterization of matter.
Knowing well about the provisional harater of the quantum mehani-
al haraterizations of matter, Weyl was deeply impressed by its suesses
already on the level of spetrosopy and the rst steps into the quantum
hemial theory of valene bonds. An invitation to give the 1930 Rouse Ball
leture at Cambridge gave Weyl the opportunity to review the whole devel-
opment of matter onepts, whih had taken plae during the long deade
just oming to an end.
Even from hindsight, he still onsidered the attempts of the early 1920s
to geometrize the whole of physis as very omprehensible at its time,
beause they had tried to follow up on Einstein's suessful geometrization
of gravitation (Weyl 1931, 338). In this historizing perspetive, he saw no
reason to distane himself from his own attempts of 1918. He summarized
25
For the Born and Jordan part see (Sholz 2004b).
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its ritial reeption by physiists and reviewed Eddington's approah to
uniation by ane onnetions, inluding Einstein's later suppport for that
program. Comparing the latter with his own metrial uniation of 1918
he onluded that from hindsight both theory types appeared as merely
geometrial dressings (geometrishe Einkleidungen) rather than as proper
geometrial theories of eletriity. He disussed the struggle between the
metrial and ane eld theories (i.e., Weyl 1918 versus Eddington/Einstein)
and gave the whole story a smilingly ironi turn:
. . . there is no longer the question whih of the two theories will
prevail in life, but only whether the two have to be buried as twin
brothers in the same grave or in two dierent graves. (Weyl 1931,
343)
In the light of his hanged view on the problem of matter, he ould nd
just as little arguments in favour of the more reent brands of uniation at-
tempts proposed at the end of the deade, Einstein's distant parallelism ap-
proah or the Kaluza-Klein approah.
26
Weyl ompletely rejeted Einstein's
new theory, not only by semantial reasons, but also by a mathematial one,
beause in his opinion it would break with the innitesimal point of view,
and warned:
The result [of pursuing Einstein's Fernparallelismus approah,
E.S.℄ is to give away nearly all what has been ahieved in the
transition from speial to general relativity. The loss is not om-
pensated by any onrete gain. (Weyl 1931, 343)
Weyl perieved a nearly omplete sienti devaluation of all unied eld
theories invented during the long deade. This devaluation resulted from the
quantum theoretial insights into matter strutures, whih had found rst
well formed mathematial representations by omplex salar or spinor elds
during the seond part of the deade:
In my opinion the whole situation has hanged during the last 4 or
5 years by the detetion of the matter eld. All these geometrial
leaps (geometrishe Luftsprünge) have been premature, we now
return to the solid ground of physial fats. (Weyl 1931, 343)
He ontinued to sketh the theory of spinor elds and the new understanding
ot the underdetermination of phase whih opened a new theoretial frame
for the gauge priniple. In 1929 he and V. Fok had proposed a revised
gauge theory of eletromagnetism in this ontext. He insisted that the new
priniple of phase gauge has grown from experiene and resumes a huge
treasury of experimental fats from spetrosopy (ibid. 344). That stood in
26
For Einstein's distant parallelism see (Sauer 2003), for Kaluza and Kaluza-Klein
(Wuensh 2003).
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marked ontrast to the purely speulative priniples on whih all the lassial
unied eld theories had been built, his own one from 1918 inluded. Now he
no longer expeted to ahieve knowledge on natural proesses by geometri
speulation, but tried to anhor it in more solid grounds, the observation of
matter proesses and their mathematization:
By the new gauge invariane the eletromagneti eld now be-
omes a neessary appendix of the matter eld, as it had been
attahed to gravitation in the old theory. (Weyl 1931, 345, em-
phasis in original)
In short, Weyl had turned from his speulative and strongly idealist ap-
proah to matter, pursued at the turn to the 1920s, to a mathematially
empiristi and moderately materialisti one at the end of the deade. He
was well aware that great diulties had still to be surmounted to ome
to grips with a quantization of the semilassial elds (omplex salar or
spinor wave funtions) whih had reently been invented for a provisional
and partial representation of the quantum properties of matter. That gave
geometry a ompletely dierent outlook to the one in the lassial eld theo-
ries, although he did not want to exlude that geometrization might beome
possible some day on a new level. But if one wanted to ontinue along this
path, he was sure that one had to set out in searh of a geometrization of the
matter eld itself. If one would try to do without an improved mathematiza-
tion of the ageny strutures of matter themselves, the geometrial theories
would fall bak to the methodologial status of the uniation attempts of
the 1920s. He now onsidered these as immature, although omprehensible
rst attempts, as Luftsprünge (leaps into the air).
It may be appropriate to add that the German word Luftsprünge not
only onnotes unrealisti rst attempts, but also the joy of youthfulness.
Weyl has had both, the joy of the youthful speulation to be lose to a
redution of physis to geometry, and the maturizing awareness that the dif-
ult praties of experimentation and losely related mathematial theory
prodution of quantum theory ontained a muh more reliable ontribution
towards the understanding of the ageny strutures of matter.
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